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The use of tourniquets for the control of hemorrhage from
traumatic injury has been long debated. Opinions on the
utility and safety of their use in this setting have alternated
between strong endorsement and outright vilification of
the device, with each of the camps backing up their con-
tentions with varying levels of anecdotal evidence. The
debate is largely fueled by experiences of military sur-
geons during wartime and the results have changed with
changing times, differing systems and circumstances in
which they have been utilized. Review of the evidence
available in the English language medical literature seems
to indicate that while neither camp is entirely correct, nei-
ther seems to be entirely without merit. The preservation
of life- even at the potential expense of a limb- should
without a doubt take precedence, but this should not lead
to the abandonment of all possible efforts to minimize
the length of time that the tourniquet is in place and the
thereby reduce the attendant risk of complications.
The literature regarding tourniquets, their use, outcomes
and complications was collected by a literature search of
various pertinent databases. These included PubMed/
MEDLINE, Ovid, EBSCOHost, and CINAHL utilizing key-
words including, but not limited to, "tourniquet",
"extremity", "hemorrhage", "bleeding", "combat", etc.
The retrieved articles were assessed for pertinent informa-
tion and the references they cited were accessed and
reviewed to minimize the chance of pertinent sources
being overlooked.
Extremity hemorrhage remains a common and significant
cause of preventable trauma fatalities, both in the civilian
world and the military theater, accounting for approxi-
mately 9% of fatalities in military actions. [1-7] Dorlac et
al reported on preventable fatalities involving isolated
extremity wounds presenting to two civilian trauma cent-
ers, and found that they occurred as 0.02% (N = 14) of the
traumas seen at the facilities, with 50% caused by gunshot
wounds and the remainder due to lacerations or stab
wounds. Eight of the patients in this group had injuries
that would have potentially benefited from management
with a tourniquet.[8] Rocko et al reported on similar inju-
ries, discussing eight cases where earlier attempts as hem-
orrhage control might have resulted in patient survival.[9]
The frequency of significant vascular injury from penetrat-
ing trauma among military personnel has been reported
by Rasmussen et al as 6.6% (N = 209). These were casual-
ties from Operation Iraqi Freedom treated at the Air Force
Theater Hospital at Balad Air Base, Iraq with 79% (N =
166) of those cases involving the vasculature of the
extremities, with the majority of these patient reaching
definitive care in under an hour. [10] This is in stark con-
trast to many of the previous experiences with tourni-
quets, which indicates why an understanding of these
circumstances is important in comprehending why the
opinions that are held about tourniquets exist and what
they mean for the current practitioner.
The first use of a tourniquet to attenuate hemorrhage from
injury is not known with absolute certainty but the exist-
ence of similar devices has been described back to at least
the Greeks. [11] Galen, the best known of the Roman sur-
geons, criticized the use of tourniquets as simply forcing
more blood from a wound and this opinion was still
repeated many years, even centuries, later by other
authors. [12] This is likely based upon observation of
patients with tourniquets that are applied with insuffi-
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cient pressure to compress the artery while restricting the
venous drainage of the affected limb.
The famous medieval physician de Chauliac described
constricting bands for the reduction of pain and control of
hemorrhage during amputation in 1586 and Ambrose
Pare was noted to employ a similar technique. [13] The
use of a triple band tourniquet system during amputa-
tions was attributed to Leonardo Botallo in the 16th cen-
tury, and the use of tourniquets under similar
circumstances was described by von Gersdoff in his Feldt-
buch der Wundtartzney ("Field Manual of Wound Medi-
cine") published in 1517. Wilhelm Fabry first described
the basis for what most envision today as a "tourniquet",
namely a device employing a windlass in 1593. [14]
A French surgeon at the Siege of Besancon in 1674 by the
name of Etienne Morel was described as employing a rudi-
mentary tourniquet during combat medical care. [15,16]
A "screw compressor" was pictured in Johannes Scultetus'
surgery text during the 17th century, but this design was
apparently limited in its utility due to issues with slippage
and other factors. [17] The problem with slipping was
reduced by Petit with his improved design that was intro-
duced in the early 18th century and allowed it to utilized
further up on the limb. [18] Petit is also the source of the
term "tourniquet" which he derived from the French verb
for "to turn" (tourner). [19]
Much of the early criticism of the use of tourniquets
stemmed from the delayed access to definitive care on the
battlefield in many conflicts. MacLeod's treatise on the
Crimean War questioned the benefit of tourniquets due to
the seemingly insignificant number of vascular injuries
that were seen in that conflict. This is more likely the result
of those who would have benefited exsanguinating on the
field while the battle was still ongoing and therefore never
being seen by a surgeon, as he himself more or less stated.
[20] This is a major issue with many of the early writings
that contributed to attitudes towards tourniquet use in
that lack of effective evacuation of wounded soldiers
proved to make the statistics provided and outcomes
cited, at best, of dubious value and, at worse, useless as a
reference for decision making. In effect, the tourniquet
bore more than its fair share of the blame for negative out-
comes stemming from multiple factors including poor
planning, lack of education of troops about the proper
care of wounds, and the marginal medical logistics that all
conspired to yield less than optimal results.
The American Civil War provided even more evidence of
the dire consequences of failing to prepare for massive
numbers of wounded soldiers. Surgeons were often seri-
ously lacking in any experience dealing with traumatic
injuries, let alone that of a recent nature sufficient to
maintain skills. The variability of entry level training of
physicians was also so great as to make broad characteri-
zations of it is nearly impossible, [19] and the lessons of
prior combat surgeons- as questionable as some of them
may be from our current perspective- on the European
continent seldom was known to the average military sur-
geon during the Civil War. The appreciable lack of medics
was also a contributing factor, despite Letterman's estab-
lishment of an Union military ambulance system on the
Napoleonic model, leaving men with minimal, if any, first
aid training laying for hours, or even days in a few cases,
on a battlefield. Gross addressed this in his 1861 text,
where he implied that the supplies for a crude tourniquet
should be part of the kit for every soldier, and the instruc-
tions on their use be provided, lest the soldiers "perish
simply from their own ignorance". [19] Both in the Man-
ual of Field Surgery and his later work A System of Surgery,
Gross was highly critical of his fellow surgeons and laid
the blame for the demise of many soldiers squarely at
their feet: "I do not envy the man his feelings who.
through ignorance, inattention, or indecision, allows his
patient to perish from loss of blood when he ought to
have saved him." [21]
The use of tourniquets, both improvised and those of pro-
fessional design (most notably that of Petit) under cir-
cumstances where surgical intervention- and admittedly a
crude form by modern standards- could not be counted
upon for hours or longer proved to be less than desirable
from the standpoint of limb salvage. Even in the face of
severe pain associated with prolonged limb ischemia,
many of the soldiers were loathe to loosen or remove a
tourniquet for fear of further bleeding: "Very many of
these wounded came into the hospital with extemporane-
ous tourniquets tightly applied, and their hands and fore-
arms swollen and livid in consequence. This dread of
hemorrhage is simply another proof of the inexperience
of the troops." [22] Similar fear of recurrent bleeding is
still common among troops today although the issue
could likely be lessened through better education of sol-
diers about the nature of war wounds.
The excessive and inappropriate use of tourniquets by
insufficiently trained and frightened soldiers on the bat-
tlefields of the Civil War led many surgeons to decry their
use altogether. This included such extreme stances as that
it was "far safer to leave the wound to nature, without any
attempt to arrest the flow of blood than depend upon the
common army tourniquet" as was attributed to one sur-
geon who was present at the Battle of Bull Run (Manas-
sas). [23] This attitude of course is the result of the
frequent amputations that followed such battles and the
use of tourniquets. However it is also the opinion of
someone who fails to taken into account the role the sys-
tem in which tourniquets were being utilized played inWorld Journal of Emergency Surgery 2007, 2:28 http://www.wjes.org/content/2/1/28
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the development of gangrene and ischemic complica-
tions. Given that after the first battle, some wounded men
were left on the battlefield for days before evacuation few
modern parallels can be drawn. The outcome of both bat-
tles, a poorly structured ambulance corps, and other fac-
tors that provoked a disastrous outcome for the casualties
led to the reform of the medical operations of both sides.
The improvements were demonstrated at the Battle of
Antietam later that same year which is considered by most
historians to be the turning point of the Civil War in
regards to medical care. [24]
While the overwhelming opinion of surgeons towards the
use of tourniquets was negative, little evidence beyond
anecdotal opinions exists on which to judge the rate of
tourniquet induced complications resulting in amputa-
tion that would have not have otherwise occurred.[21]
The few sources that do cite data rely upon the questiona-
ble statistics that were included in MacLeod's Crimean
War history, thereby grossly underestimating the fre-
quency of vascular injury. Confederate Surgeon General
Chisolm admitted in his text, while attempting to discour-
age the use of tourniquets that when vascular injuries do
occur, the patient often exsanguinates so quickly that
intervention is "of little avail".[25] Thus, he blatantly dis-
regarded the most obvious- and probably least debatable-
indication for the use of tourniquets, that being the
attempted preservation of life at any cost, including the
sacrifice of an extremity.
The "disasters" that stemmed from such hindrances even
provoked knee-jerk reactions that may well have cost sol-
diers their lives for little benefit, such as that proffered by
Tuffier who was a respected surgeon with the French Army
during the First World War. He recommended that as
soon as ambulance crews encountered a patient with a
tourniquet in place that it be removed. [26] Given that the
patient most likely had been laying in "no man's land" for
many hours with the tourniquet in place, the likelihood of
the immediate removal of the tourniquet offering any
improvement in the outcome for the limb is highly sus-
pect and the possibility of provoking further hemorrhage
would more likely be the result.
One of the most dramatic, and retrospectively short-
sighted, denunciations of tourniquets can be found in
Injuries and Diseases of War, which was a British manual
that was reprinted in the United States in 1918:
"The systematic use of the elastic tourniquet cannot be
too severely condemned. The employment of it,
except as a temporary measure during an operation,
usually indicates that the person using it is quite igno-
rant both of how to stop bleeding properly and also of
the danger to life and limb caused by the tourniquet .
. . If an orderly has applied a tourniquet, it is the duty
of the medical officer who first sees the patient to
remove it at once, and to examine the limb so as to
ascertain whether there is any bleeding at all, and if
there is, to use proper measures for its arrest."
Once again, the admonition never to allow a tourniquet
to be left in place beyond the prehospital phase of care
was repeated due to the risk of pain, infection and ampu-
tation.[27] While immediate conversion to less aggressive
measures of hemorrhage control are optimal, such across
the board advice is most likely the source of the modern
day hesitancy to utilize tourniquets in any manner. One
must question whether this belief arose as the product of
a seriously flawed system of medical care, as obviously
existed, rather than an inherent flaw in the idea behind
the use of tourniquets.
More useful information regarding tourniquets, still
largely applicable, was provided by Tuttle[28]:
1. Never cover over or bandage a tourniquet.
2. Write plainly on the emergency medical tag the word
'tourniquet.'
3. If the injured man is conscious, he should be instructed
to tell every medical officer with whom he comes in con-
tact that he has a tourniquet on.
Tuttle also emphasized the use of arterial "pressure
points" to "buy time" in which other methods of control
can be employed, including the application of a tourni-
quet.
Bailey in his seminal text on war surgery, published dur-
ing the Second World War, gave a great deal of attention
to the subject of tourniquets and indicated that tourni-
quets have a place in management of arterial bleeding that
fails to respond to other interventions. He also suggested
the preemptive application of a loosely applied tourni-
quet in cases of secondary hemorrhage and their use to
provide a bloodless surgical field.[29] The latter use has
become commonplace in hospitals around the world
today, through the application of pneumatic tourniquets
in orthopedic procedures.
The text also reinforced the need for proper and early
identification of those patients with tourniquets in place,
through proper labeling. Increased bleeding from insuffi-
cient pressure, as mentioned above, was also pointed out
as a potential hazard of the use of tourniquets, while at the
same time the use of excessive pressure was discouraged
due to the risk of local skin damage and other complica-
tions. A quote from Bailey is one of the best summationsWorld Journal of Emergency Surgery 2007, 2:28 http://www.wjes.org/content/2/1/28
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of the subject matter found anywhere, stating that a tour-
niquet should be "regarded with respect because of the
damage it may cause, and with reverence because of the
lives it undoubtedly saves. It is not to be used lightly in
every case of a bleeding wound, but applied courageously
when life is in danger." [29]
During the preparations for the invasion of Normandy in
1944, the Allied Forces medical personnel were provided
with a text that included instructions for the care of vascu-
lar injuries. Part of this advice was a statement that any
limb requiring a tourniquet that remained in place during
evacuation would most likely require amputation but that
any suspected or known injury to the blood vessels was
sufficient reason to send a tourniquet along with the
patient during transport should the need for it arise. [30]
One of the best articles with the sole purpose of examin-
ing issues related to tourniquet use in a large group was
written during WWII by Wolff and Adkins which looked
at a series of over 200 wounded servicemen who had tour-
niquets applied. The authors were critical of the strap and
buckle tourniquet issued by the Army, due to its inade-
quate occlusive pressures and the tendency to dig into tis-
sues. They also described occlusive times of up to six
hours with no clinically significant damage depending on
which extremity was involved and the environmental con-
ditions; anecdotal reports from cases occurring during the
wintertime indicated that cold temperatures and resultant
cooling of the affected limb might lead to minimal nega-
tive effect on the limb despite prolonged ischemic times.
Wolff and Adkins rank among the staunchest advocates of
the use of tourniquets in combat casualty care during
WWII. They firmly denounced the fears of damage stem-
ming solely from the use of the tourniquet, finding not a
single case of gangrene directly attributable to the use of
such a device alone, nor were thromboembolic events,
skin damage, excessive edema or nerve damage reported
during the postoperative management of any of their
patients.[31]
The United States Army Medical Department in a review
of the medical services of World War II stated that soldiers
frequently misused tourniquets, failed to alert staff at aid
stations of their presence and otherwise contributed to
negative outcomes stemming from the use of tourniquets.
This was such a widespread problem that their use was
restricted in one unit that the senior surgeon ordered that
the only reason for the use of such a device was for the
control of "active spurting hemorrhage from a major
artery". The directive was also issued to reinforce the
proper documentation of the placement of a tourniquet
to allow rapid notification of upper echelon personnel.
[3,32] The early advice to loosen the tourniquet every 30
minutes to allow perfusion of the limb via collateral circu-
lation due to the fact that the practice put a patient at risk
of bleeding to death by slow degrees was also replaced
with orders that a tourniquet that should only be removed
by a medical officer. This opinion continues to be com-
mon practice today.[26,33]
It should be noted, for the sake of full disclosure, that per-
haps not all of the blame for poor outcomes should be
trained at the tourniquet or the men applying them, or the
system in which they functioned- although admittedly the
delays in access to operative intervention undoubtedly
played a role as did the inappropriate battlefield care of
the wounded. The operative techniques employed by mil-
itary surgeons for vascular trauma suffered, secondary to
both the case volume and a failure of the military medical
system to learn the lessons of prior conflicts. Ligation of
arteries was a common practice especially during the early
stages of the war, and one that produced a high rate of
gangrene as documented in the literature.[34,35] This is
in no way a condemnation or an attack on the skill and
dedication of the surgeons who served the militaries of all
the combatant nations, but rather another sad example of
history repeating itself when appropriate lessons are either
not learned or not applied. This is supported by the fact
that as the war progressed, amputation rates decreased as
surgeons gained experience with the injuries common on
the battlefield, in which they were not well educated prior
to their deployment due to oversight on the part of their
commanders.
One of the most notable military surgeons deployed to
Korea was Dr. Carl Hughes and his publications on com-
bat related vascular trauma provide valuable insight into
the progress that was made during the intervening years
between then end of WWII and the start of hostilities in
Korea. While he was openly critical of the manner in
which many tourniquets during that conflict were
applied,[36] he has been quoted as recently saying "I do
not recall ever seeing limb loss as a result of a tourniquet.
They were important, even life saving, in Korea. Successful
use of the tourniquet depends on what it is made of, and
how it is applied". [24] The recounted experiences of
Jahnke, Hughes and others during this time also serve to
dispel the myth that a tourniquet is invariably associated
with amputations, while reinforcing the role that evacua-
tion delays played in amputation following tourniquet
application, as more attempts were made at limb salvage
through vascular repair techniques. [37,38]
Improvised tourniquets were commonplace during the
conflict in Vietnam and their use by medics was deemed
to be more judicious by some of the attending surgeons
with at least one (JE Hutton) attributing this to the fact
that "most of our medics were college graduates, were
bright and well trained." [24] Also the preemptive use ofWorld Journal of Emergency Surgery 2007, 2:28 http://www.wjes.org/content/2/1/28
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fasciotomies became more common as a step in combat-
ing compartment syndrome associated with prolonged
tourniquet use, which was much less frequent than
encountered in any previous war due to the unprece-
dented use of helicopters as a primary means of casualty
evacuation. It has been said repeatedly before that many
soldiers wounded in southeast Asia owe their lives to the
"Dustoff" crews (that is, United States Army medical evac-
uation helicopter crews), but perhaps this is better
rephrased as many of the wounded owe their lives and
their limbs to these brave souls.
However, not all surgical authorities serving in the Viet-
nam War have such uniformly positive assessments of the
use of tourniquets. Dr. Norman Rich reported the anecdo-
tal case of an upper arm injury that was bleeding because
of the presence of the tourniquet, the removal of which
staunched the hemorrhage.[24] He later went on to state
that the necessity of the use of tourniquets in Vietnam was
an infrequent occurrence.[39] Regardless of their stance
on this issue, the dedication, resourcefulness and talents
of the Vietnam medical personnel are largely responsible
for the current era of limb salvage that stems from rapid
evacuation and early and aggressive operative interven-
tion.[10]
Until recent years, the staunchest supporters of the use of
tourniquets were the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and
widespread use by the IDF yielded some of the best data
available on the complications associated with modern
battlefield use of tourniquets. Despite what may best be
described as overzealous utilization by soldiers, there has
been a paucity of complications reported and those that
have occurred are most often temporary in nature. The
isolated incidents of permanent complications were asso-
ciated with prolonged use of a tourniquet and serve as fur-
ther evidence that the opinion of tourniquets as invariably
damaging to the limb is misguided. [40]
Despite the methodological misgivings of a few [41], the
Lakstein study- particularly when considered along with
other reports that are discussed elsewhere in this paper-
shows that tourniquets are an acceptably safe and effective
means of hemorrhage control on the modern battlefield
where rapid access to definitive intervention is the rule,
rather than the exception. The use of tourniquets amongst
special operations troops has been particularly wide-
spread in the US military for quite some time, and the
experiences of the Rangers in Somalia provide additional
evidence of the benefits offered by the use of tourniquets
by military personnel.[5] Other special operations units
also encourage tourniquet use for hemorrhage control in
combat situations. [42-44]
The aggressive use of tourniquets among trauma patients
transported to the Air Force Theater Hospital at Balad led
to no cases of serious complication, even when taking into
account infrequent cases of inappropriate use (in the set-
ting of no major arterial injury). This is presumably due to
the rapid evacuation of casualties and the short time to
operative intervention, often less than one hour [10].
Chambers reported even more rapid arrival of patients at
facilities with surgical capability in his paper reporting the
experiences of the United States Marine Corps' Forward
Resuscitative Surgical System. [45] This contrasts with the
average time for similar cases in the Vietnam War where
the time to operation for a majority of patients was vari-
ously reported as 90 minutes for all patients with ballistic
injury, [46] up to five and a half hours for injuries to the
popliteal artery treated aboard a United States Navy hos-
pital ship [47]. Regardless of which study is relied upon,
there was an improvement over the average of 9.2 hours
reported in the Korean War [48].
The data from Balad is comparable to the earlier report
based upon patients treated at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center, [49] but rate of vascular injury is significantly
higher than reports that looked at rates of similar injury
among military personnel in Vietnam who survived to be
treated at military medical facilities, which routinely
reported rates of between 2–3%. [50,51] In the report
from Iraq, Rasmussen and his colleagues suggested several
possible reasons for the disparity, including better docu-
mentation of vascular trauma among casualties and
increased survival of patients with peripheral vascular
trauma due to improvements in body armor lessening
mortality from thoracoabdominal trauma. [10]
Walters and Mabry stated that the proper use of tourni-
quets could potentially prevent seven of every 100 deaths
due to combat related injury. [33,52] A similar positive
attitude can be found in many of the recent articles deal-
ing with tourniquets. The review by Welling et al contains
several anecdotal statements from experienced military
physicians who indicate the utility of the tourniquets in
modern combat and the lack of significant complica-
tions.[17] The military's Emergency War Surgery text explic-
itly supports the use of tourniquets in combat, encourages
risk to benefits assessment in any setting other than active
combat but admonishing that no life under should be lost
due to hesitance from perceived risks of limb loss.[53] The
author of this paper has personal anecdotal experience
with the successful prehospital use of a blood pressure
cuff to control arterial bleeding while pressure dressings
were applied to a combative patient with an amputation
of the hand secondary to a lawnmower accident.
The fact that many of those who perish in combat do so
rapidly and before evacuation to combat hospitals or aidWorld Journal of Emergency Surgery 2007, 2:28 http://www.wjes.org/content/2/1/28
Page 6 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
stations can be accomplished, with the majority being due
to hemorrhage with the source of the bleeding in many
cases being an extremity wound. As Welling pointed out,
the only chance to save these lives rests with the medics
and the soldiers themselves [17]. Given the nature of care
under fire- the risks to the caregiver, the need for rapid
extrication of the wounded to cover, and the frequency of
mass casualty events- to express expectation that direct
pressure can be utilized as a first line response under such
circumstances is to speak to one's lack of awareness of the
circumstances faced by the medic and the wounded alike.
It is for this reason that the United States military has
emphasized the use of tourniquets during the prehospital
care of wounded and sought out a design that was able to
be self-applied by a wounded soldier. [43,54] Not only
does a properly applied tourniquet control hemorrhage
[55-57] and allow time for the gravely wounded to reach
definitive care, they also provide the chance for the medic
to render care to other injured persons. Such practices may
also facilitate transport of casualties, especially in the case
of multiple victims.
The control of hemorrhage in the civilian setting is less
fraught with serious risk to the first responder and there-
fore is much more able to follow the traditional stepwise
approach recommended by most authorities. The advice
of Rich and Spencer, which includes packing of the
wound with associated arterial hemorrhage, direct pres-
sure and pressure dressings [39] is probably the best
approach when sufficient manpower and safe circum-
stances to allow intervention by trained and skilled pro-
viders. Outside of situations necessitating expedient
evacuation of casualties, the use of a tourniquet will be
necessary only infrequently but should be considered in
any case where hemorrhage is ongoing and life threaten-
ing. This approach is similar to that recommended by
Aucar and Hirshberg, [58] as well as that recommended
by the Advanced Trauma Life Support manuals [59,60], as
well as the US Army Survival Manual [61] which is widely
distributed to the general public through a civilian pub-
lisher.
However, the safest approach in the case of the marginally
trained and inexperienced person with basic first aid train-
ing is probably to rely upon simple direct pressure or basic
forms of pressure dressing. This is due to a lack of evidence
that such persons can effectively recognize the need for a
tourniquet and properly apply such a device- especially
given the likely need to improvise under such circum-
stances. [9,62] This last point is illustrated by a case of
femoral artery transection by broadhead arrow as the
result of a deer hunting accident to which the author
responded as an emergency medical technician. The vic-
tim's nephew had attempted to place a tourniquet made
from the victim's belt prior to going for help. The patient
was deceased due to blood loss at the time of the arrival of
the author and his coworkers. It was determined that the
bystander had improperly placed tourniquet distal to the
injury and with insufficient force to be of any utility even
if it were in a proper position.
Probably the strongest argument towards the broader use
of tourniquets in the field is the experience of the United
States military, [63-65] such as in Iraq where the combi-
nation of aggressive hemorrhage control and rapid trans-
port has produced minimal complications associated to
tourniquet use. [66-69] A few anecdotal reports of deaths
that may have been preventable by the timely application
of tourniquets for control of bleeding have also emerged
from the battlefields of the Middle East and serve to point
out that while improvements in care have been made,
there are still cases that can be learned from.[70] While
the tourniquets can not be given sole credit, their ability
to allow those who would have otherwise bled out to
receive the full benefit of modern trauma care as was
described by the Balad vascular team and other- early
thrombectomy and heparin administration along with
vascular reconstruction or shunting and fasciotomy when
necessary- can not be denied.
The use of tourniquet as a "stopgap" measure in combat
[56]- with reassessment of the necessity of the tourniquet
as soon as situational conditions allow- is part of the Tac-
tical Combat Casualty Care course the United States Army
conducts. [71,72] This emphasis on conversion to less
aggressive means of hemorrhage control whenever possi-
ble may be one reason that reports from the Iraq theater
of operations describe the presence of unnecessary tourni-
quets upon arrival at medical facilities as infrequent. This
attitude has been incorporated into the military version of
the Prehospital Trauma Life Support (PHTLS) manual,
[73] which is widely used in the education not only of
military personnel, but also in the education of tactical
medics in the law enforcement community as well. Even
some staunch opponents of the widespread use of tourni-
quets admit that the temporary use of tourniquets under
tactical conditions or similar circumstances is acceptable
to effect the safe extraction of the wounded party. [40,41]
The rapid employment of tourniquets may also provide
an opportunity to improve the prognosis for those who
might otherwise not receive care due to the severity of
their injuries in a mass casualty situation where triage
principles are applied. The expedient control of extremity
hemorrhage may allow a few of these patients to survive
long enough for them to be evacuated even when a medic
may be forced to move on to another patient due to prior-
itization.[74] This is similar to techniques employed in
damage control surgery- in both combat and civilian set-
tings- where pneumatic tourniquets have been used inWorld Journal of Emergency Surgery 2007, 2:28 http://www.wjes.org/content/2/1/28
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place of vascular clamps to allow the control of more
immediately life threatening thoracic and abdominal
injuries, as well as in isolated orthopedic cases prior to
reconstruction or shunting. [66,67,75,76] It has also been
utilized for the control of hemorrhage during ongoing
emergency department resuscitation of combat casual-
ties.[77] While the possibility of such a technique being
utilized outside of a medical facility is speculative at this
point, it might be worthy of further investigation to deter-
mine the feasibility and utility of such a recommendation.
The use of tourniquets, while beneficial to many of those
wound in combat or with otherwise uncontrollable bleed-
ing, is not without its hazards and potential complica-
tions. Any use of a tourniquet must be with full awareness
of the risks involved and to brush these aside would be to
abandon one of the basic tenets of evidence based medi-
cal practice.
Most of the complications stemming from tourniquet use
are either the result of direct pressure on underlying tis-
sues or the byproducts of ischemia distal to the site of
application. While most of the complications that have
been reported in association with their use (both for con-
trol of hemorrhage and as an adjunct to surgery) have
been localized, there are systemic complications that can
result including thromboembolic events [78], most nota-
bly pulmonary embolism; renal failure due to rhabdomy-
olysis [79-84]; lactic and respiratory acidosis,
hyperkalemia, arrhythmias, and shock[85].
The use of tourniquets during elective surgery has led to
reports of cardiac arrest secondary to circulatory overload
in patients with poor cardiac reserve resulting from a func-
tional increase in the circulating blood volume. This is
likely to not be a factor in a hypovolemic trauma patient
but may play a role in the case of a patient with underlying
heart disease who is being fluid resuscitated with a tourni-
quet in place. Tourniquet removal postoperatively has
produced transient increases in end-tidal carbon dioxide
levels, and transient decreases in central venous pressure
and blood pressure. The former may be of significance in
a patient with head trauma, but the effect can be mini-
mized through hyperventilation of the patient. Release of
a tourniquet has also been described to induce brief sys-
temic thrombolysis as a result of the stimulation of vari-
ous anticoagulation mechanisms by ischemia.[86]
Localized complications have included pain, erythema or
localized bullous skin lesions, nerve damage [78,87] from
paresthesias to paralysis of the affected limb, vascular
spasm, fracture of atheromatous plaque, muscle injury
[88], gangrene and other infectious complications,
edema, to compartment syndrome [78]. The nerve and
muscle injuries may be transient or permanent in
nature[89], although the latter is exceedingly uncommon
in most settings today where tourniquets are utilized for
hemorrhage control. This is due to a strong positive corre-
lation between the length of time the tourniquet is in
place and the rate and severity of complications that
result.[39,90] A similar correlation exists with the amount
of pressure produced by the tourniquet,[91,92] but this is
mainly an issue with improvised tourniquets and those
with a width of one inch or less. It should also be noted
that patients with preexisting neuropathies, such as those
associated with diabetes or alcohol abuse, appear to be at
an increased risk of nerve injury,[93] and other factors
may also serve to predispose patients to nerve related
complications.
Complications of questionable association, due to a lack
of corroborating clinical evidence in injured human sub-
jects to support such claims, include the possible affects of
inflammatory mediators on the gut mucosa following
ischemia of a limb. This assertion was made by persons
with a stated distrust of the use of tourniquets and was
accompanied by an unsubstantiated claim that the use of
a tourniquet in the hypotensive patient places the patient
at a "considerable risk" of loss of life.[41] Such conten-
tions are largely refuted by the volume of cases that have
been recently entered into the literature as a result of cur-
rent military operations without any indication that seri-
ous complications of a systemic or localized nature have
been frequently associated with the short term (< 2 hrs)
use of tourniquets for hemorrhage control. It is for this
reason that until evidence supporting such claims of neg-
ative systemic outcomes stemming directly and without
question from the use of tourniquets by properly trained
and equipped medical professionals, the assertions to that
effect must be viewed with a certain degree of skepticism.
Failure of a tourniquet is usually the result of insufficient
pressure, but this can easily be prevented by reinforcing
during the training of those who will be employing such
devices that total arterial occlusion is the goal. There have
been isolated cases reported among surgical patients
where extreme calcification of the arteries prevented effec-
tive use of tourniquets for the establishment of a blood-
less field.[94-96] This is unlikely however to be a
significant factor in the use of tourniquets for hemorrhage
control.
There are still several unanswered or only partially
answered question regarding the use of tourniquets and
the attendant complications, infrequent as they may be in
current practice. These include the role of hypothermia
[31,97-101] and agents such as antioxidants in minimiz-
ing muscle and nerve damage from ischemia. The former
has already been demonstrated to be of benefit on a lim-
ited basis, with even a marginal (2–3 degrees Celsius)World Journal of Emergency Surgery 2007, 2:28 http://www.wjes.org/content/2/1/28
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decrease in muscle temperature has been shown to be
beneficial.[32] Further research into these aspects of
trauma care, and others, are still needed and therefore
should be encouraged.
The use of the tourniquet in hemorrhage control is likely
to remain controversial for the near future, however given
the best evidence available mandates serious reconsidera-
tion of the attitudes that we as a profession hold toward
this practice. While there are potential risks involved in
the utilization of tourniquets should not be overlooked,
expeditious and clinically and/or situation appropriate
application in the presence of potentially life threatening
hemorrhage is in keeping not only with the standards of
the medical professions, but accordingly so with the best
interests of the patient.
Based upon the best evidence available from the litera-
ture, the following conclusions are drawn:
- Emergency medical personnel, both civilian and mili-
tary, should be trained in and equipped for the proper use
of tourniquets; the focus of first aid training for civilian
populations should continue to deemphasize their use
and focus instead on early medical assistance and the use
of direct pressure to control hemorrhage.
- No patient should exsanguinate from an extremity
wound because of the hesitance of a medical professional
to utilize a tourniquet to control bleeding due to fear of
potential complications.
- In circumstances- such as combat (or the civilian equiv-
alent thereof), high risk of building collapse, fire, or
explosions- where expedient movement of the patient is
necessary for the safety of the patient and the caregivers,
the use of a tourniquet is appropriate to gain control of
life threatening hemorrhage
- The existence of a mass casualty incident may be an indi-
cation for the use of tourniquets for temporary control of
hemorrhage while the situation is brought under control.
- The need for a tourniquet applied to allow movement of
a wounded person or during a mass casualty incident
should be reevaluated at the earliest possible time;
- The mere presence of an amputation with hemorrhage
does not necessitate the use of a tourniquet; most bleed-
ing from such injuries are controllable through use of
direct pressure, elevation and packing of the wound. If
these actions do not achieve hemostasis, then the use of a
tourniquet is indicated.
- Tourniquets may be placed proximal to the site of
uncontrollable bleeding around an impaled object; under
no circumstances should the tourniquet be applied over
the impaled object.
- Tourniquets should not be applied over joints, or over
clothing. It should also be at least 3–5 centimeters from
the wound margins. The rule of the thumb the author
used when teaching was to place it the width of the palm
of a hand proximal to the wound whenever possible, as
this provides an easy frame of reference.
- Any limb with an applied tourniquet should be fully
exposed with removal of all clothing, and the tourniquet
should never be covered with an form of bandage. The
patient should be clearly marked so as the presence of a
tourniquet will be know, along with the time it was
placed. It may also be advisable to instruct a conscious
patient to tell every medical provider they come in contact
with about the presence of a tourniquet.
- Continued bleeding (other than medullary oozing from
fracture bones) distal to the site of the tourniquet is a sign
of insufficient pressure and a need to tighten the tourni-
quet further.
- A tourniquet should not be loosened in any patient with
obvious signs of shock, amputation that necessitated use
of such a device to control bleeding, recurrent hemor-
rhage upon release of the tourniquet or any case where the
hemorrhage associated with the wound would be
expected to be uncontrollable by any other means.
- Any tourniquet that has been in place for more than six
hours should be left in place until arrival at a facility capa-
ble of definitive care.
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